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Abstract—An adversarial machine learning approach is intro-
duced to launch jamming attacks on wireless communications
and a defense strategy is presented. A cognitive transmitter uses
a pre-trained classifier to predict the current channel status based
on recent sensing results and decides whether to transmit or not,
whereas a jammer collects channel status and ACKs to build a
deep learning classifier that reliably predicts the next successful
transmissions and effectively jams them. This jamming approach
is shown to reduce the transmitter’s performance much more
severely compared with random or sensing-based jamming. The
deep learning classification scores are used by the jammer for
power control subject to an average power constraint. Next,
a generative adversarial network (GAN) is developed for the
jammer to reduce the time to collect the training dataset by
augmenting it with synthetic samples. As a defense scheme, the
transmitter deliberately takes a small number of wrong actions
in spectrum access (in form of a causative attack against the
jammer) and therefore prevents the jammer from building a
reliable classifier. The transmitter systematically selects when to
take wrong actions and adapts the level of defense to mislead the
jammer into making prediction errors and consequently increase
its throughput.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, jammer, adversarial machine
learning, deep learning, generative adversarial network, power
control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various detection, classification and prediction tasks are
performed by cognitive radios that use their task outcomes
to learn from and adapt to their spectrum environment. These
tasks can be effectively performed by machine learning [1], [2]
such as spectrum sensing, signal detection, channel estimation,
and modulation classification.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications,
wireless medium is susceptible to adversaries that can learn
and jam the ongoing transmissions. There are various ways
of launching wireless jamming attacks such as random and
sensing-based jamming, and their impact can be detrimental
to network performance [3]. Different countermeasures against
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jamming have been developed using conventional methods
such as frequency-hopping and transmit power control [4].
However, the vulnerabilities of cognitive radio systems using
machine learning and potential mitigation techniques are not
well understood yet. With the increasing use of machine
learning in wireless communication systems, it is critical to
understand the security implications of machine learning for
cognitive radios. Adversarial machine learning has emerged
as a field that studies learning in the presence of an adversary
and aims to enable safe adoption of machine learning to the
emerging applications. In this paper, we leverage and advance
techniques from adversarial machine learning to design jam-
ming attacks and mitigation solutions.
We consider a communication system where both the trans-
mitter and the jammer use machine learning to learn the
spectrum and make their transmit decisions by adapting to the
spectrum dynamics. We study a canonical wireless communi-
cation scenario with a transmitter, a receiver, a jammer, and
another background traffic source. The transmitter senses the
channel and transmits data to a receiver if the channel is found
idle. While traditional algorithms for predicting idle channels
may be as simple as comparing sensing results with some
threshold (i.e., energy detector), more advanced techniques
may be needed in a dynamic wireless environment with
complex channel and transmitter characteristics. To determine
the idle channel status, the transmitter first trains a supervised
machine learning classifier using recent sensing results as the
input and the status of the background transmitter (on or
off) as the labels. During normal operation, this pre-trained
machine learning classifier classifies the channel as “idle” or
“busy” by using the recent sensing results. We also discuss
the generalization of this scenario to multiple transmitters and
receivers.
In the context of adversarial machine learning, the jammer
applies an exploratory attack (also called inference attack)
to understand the outcome of the transmitter’s operations as
a preliminary step before jamming. Exploratory attacks have
been considered in different data domains (such as image and
text analysis) [5]–[9]. Note that in the general setting of an
exploratory attack, the jammer aims to build a classifier that is
functionally equivalent to the target classifier under the attack,
i.e., provides the same output as the target classifier for the
same given input. While the attack considered in this paper
shares this main idea, there is an important difference in the
sense that the input and the output in classifiers are different
for the target (i.e., the transmitter) and the adversary (i.e., the
jammer) due to the following reasons:
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1) The input (sensing results) is different since the jammer
and the transmitter are at different locations and are
subject to different channels.
2) The jammer does not need to distinguish idle channels
or transmissions that are likely to fail. Instead, the
jammer should predict whether there will be a successful
transmission (i.e., whether the transmitter will decide to
transmit and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) will exceed a threshold at the receiver) so that
it jams a transmission that would succeed if it was not
jammed.
The classifier built at the jammer is functionally equivalent to
the one at the transmitter only in the sense that the jammer’s
classifier will decide to jam if and only if it predicts that there
will be a successful transmission (in the absence of jamming)
for the same instance. If the receiver successfully receives
a packet, it sends an ACK as feedback to the transmitter;
otherwise there is no feedback. During the learning period, the
jammer senses the channel to determine whether there is an
ACK or not, i.e., ACK signal plus noise vs. noise. The jammer
needs to jam only if there will be an ACK. Thus, the jammer
builds a deep learning classifier (i.e., trains a deep neural
network) with two labels (“ACK” or “no ACK”) by using
the most recent sensing results (received signal strengths) as
the features. The jammer has two objectives: minimize the
misdetection probability (for effective jamming) and minimize
the false alarm probability (to save energy or avoid being
detected). Thus, the jammer only jams if it predicts there
will be an ACK and aims to minimize the maximum of
misdetection and false alarm probabilities of its prediction.
We show that the exploratory attack approach is very
effective, i.e., for the scenario studied in numerical results,
it reduces the transmitter’s throughput from 0.766 packet/slot
to 0.050 packet/slot. However, random jammer or sensing-
based jammer that makes decisions based on instantaneous
sensing results is not as effective since the transmitter can still
sustain throughput of 0.383 packet/slot against random jammer
or 0.140 packet/slot against sensing-based jammer (with the
best sensing threshold). In addition, the success of sensing-
based jammer strongly depends on the selection of the sensing
threshold.
We also consider power control at the jammer such that the
jammer adjusts its transmit power subject to an average power
constraint. In particular, the jammer selects its transmit power
at any time slot as a function of the deep learning classification
score that measures the likelihood of the jamming opportunity
in that slot. We show that as the jammer’s power budget is re-
laxed, its jamming success improves such that the performance
(the throughput and the success ratio) of the transmitter drops.
We show that the jamming performance drops when the
jammer can only collect limited spectrum data (over limited
time) for training purposes. To reduce the learning period
before launching the attack, we develop the approach for the
jammer to apply the generative adversarial network (GAN)
[10] that generates synthetic data based on a small number
of real data samples in a short learning period and augments
the training data with these synthetic data samples. The GAN
consists of a generator and a discriminator playing a minimax
game. The generator aims to generate realistic data (with
labels), while the discriminator aims to distinguish data gen-
erated by the generator as real or synthetic. Our results show
that the detection performance of the jammer that augments its
training data with synthetic data is very close (within 0.19%
for misdetection and 3.14% for false alarm) to the performance
of the jammer that uses an increased number of real data
samples (collected over a longer period of time) for training.
Other attacks such as evasion attacks and causative or poi-
soning attacks can be launched after exploratory attacks. These
attacks have been extensively studied for other data domains
such as computer vision. With evasion attacks [11], [12], the
adversary attempts to fool the machine learning algorithm into
making a wrong decision (e.g., fooling a security algorithm
into accepting an adversary as legitimate). With causative or
poisoning attacks [13], [14], the adversary provides incorrect
data to a machine learning-based application when it is re-
trained in supervised learning. These attacks can be launched
separately or combined, e.g., causative and evasion attacks
can be launched by building upon the inference results of an
exploratory attack [15].
Motivated by these attack schemes, we design a defense
scheme for the transmitter. The basic idea is to make the
transmitter’s behavior unpredictable, which can be enforced
by the transmitter taking some deliberately wrong actions
(i.e., transmitting on a busy channel or not transmitting on an
idle channel) in some selected time slots. This corresponds
to a causative attack launched by the transmitter back at
the jammer. To maximize the impact of a small number of
wrong actions, the transmitter uses the classification scores
(an intermediate result) that are determined by the machine
learning algorithm for spectrum sensing. Such a score is within
[0, 1] and compared with a threshold to classify channels. If
this score is far away from the threshold (i.e., close to 0 or 1),
the confidence of classification is high and the corresponding
time instance should be selected to take the wrong action
because it can more successfully deceive the jammer that aims
to mimic the transmitter’s behavior. A very small number
of wrong decisions cannot fool the jammer. On the other
hand, a large number of wrong decisions would prevent the
transmitter from using the spectrum efficiently and reduce the
performance significantly even in the absence of a jammer.
Hence, there is a balance on how many wrong actions to take.
We show that by taking a small number of wrong actions
on carefully selected time instances (based on its classifier’s
likelihood scores), the transmitter can fool the jammer into
making a significant number of prediction errors. Thus, the
transmitter’s performance can be improved significantly from
0.050 packet/slot to 0.216 packet/slot. Note that random and
sensing-based jamming cannot be mitigated by this defense
scheme. We provide an adaptive defense scheme that does
not assume the knowledge of the jammer type and allows the
transmitter to optimize its defense level on the fly based on
its achieved throughput.
We start with a static scenario and then extend to two
mobile scenarios. In the first mobile scenario, we keep the
distance between the jammer and the receiver fixed and let the
jammer move on a circle around the receiver. In the second
mobile scenario, we keep the distance between the background
transmitter and the jammer fixed. We show that the jammer is
more effective as it gets closer to the receiver (so the received
power level at the receiver is higher) or to the background
traffic source (so it can infer better when the transmitter will
succeed next).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the related work. Section III describes the system
model. Section IV describes the transmitter’s algorithm and
shows the performance when there is no jamming. Section V
describes the jammer’s algorithm and shows the performance
under deep learning, sensing-based and random attacks, and
introduces power control at the jammer. Section VI applies the
GAN to reduce the learning period for the jammer. Section VII
presents the defense scheme and shows the attack mitigation
performance. Section VIII includes the extension of network
setting with mobile scenarios. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Machine learning has recently been applied to various prob-
lems in wireless communications [16], [17]. In particular, deep
learning has shown its potential to learn complex spectrum
environments. A convolutional neural network (CNN) was
used in [18] for spectrum sensing. A GAN was used in [19]
to augment the training data for spectrum sensing. Channel
estimation was performed in [20] using a feedforward neural
network (FNN) and modulation classification was performed
in [21] using a CNN.
A review on physical layer attacks of cognitive radio
networks including sensing falsification, jamming and eaves-
dropping was provided in [22]. An adaptive, jamming-resistant
spectrum access protocol was proposed in [23] for cognitive
radio ad hoc networks, where there are multiple channels that
the secondary users can utilize. Jamming games between a
cognitive user and a smart jammer was considered in [24],
where they individually determine their transmit powers.
Game theory has been instrumental to analyze the conflict-
ing interactions between transmitters and jammers. A game-
theoretic framework to derive the optimal jamming attack and
detection strategies was considered in [25] for wireless ad hoc
networks. A jamming attack scenario when both the victim
and the attacker are energy-constrained was considered in [26]
through a multi-stage game formulation where the dynamics
of full information is available at both sides. A stochastic
game framework for an anti-jamming defense was proposed
in [27] assuming cognitive attackers can adapt their strategies
to the time-varying spectrum environment and the strategies
of secondary users.
A deep Q-network algorithm was used in [28] for sec-
ondary users to decide whether to leave an area of heavy
jamming or choose a frequency-hopping pattern to defeat
smart jammers. Cumulative sum method was used in [29] as a
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Fig. 1. The scenario and the steps to launch and mitigate the attack.
statistical intrusion detection mechanism at the secondary user.
The throughput optimization problem for the secondary users
under jamming attacks was formulated in [30] as a Markov
Decision Process and a learning algorithm was proposed for
the secondary user to find an optimal transmission policy. The
jammer does not typically use machine learning techniques in
these works. A spectrum data poisoning attack was considered
in [31] by employing deep learning to manipulate the training
data collected during spectrum sensing and fool a transmitter
into making wrong transmission decisions. In this paper, we
focus on jamming the data transmissions, apply deep neural
networks to learn the subtle traffic, channel, and interference
characteristics leading to the transmission success, and build
the jamming strategy accordingly to maximize its impact on
the transmitter’s communication performance. Deep learning
is used at both the transmitter and the jammer to make trans-
mission and jamming decisions, respectively. A preliminary
version of the material in this paper was partially presented in
[32] under limited network, channel, and jammer models.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 shows the system model. We consider a wireless
communication scenario with one transmitter T , one receiver
R, and one jammer J . This setting is instrumental in studying
the fundamentals of jamming and defense strategies in wireless
access [33]. There is a background traffic source B, whose
transmission behavior is not known by either T or J . As
will be discussed in Section VIII, the developed algorithms
can be easily extended to multiple mobile transmitters and
receivers, while a single jammer alone can jam nodes within
its transmission range.
After T builds its deep learning classifier (to make trans-
mission decisions), J launches its attack using the following
three main steps (see Fig. 1):
1) J senses the spectrum and collects training data.
2) J trains its adversarial deep learning classifier (that
predicts whether there will be a successful transmission).
3) J jams the predicted successful transmissions.
Fig. 1 also shows that T defends against this attack by adding
controlled errors to its decisions to mislead the training process
of J .
A. Operation Modes
There is a single channel and time is divided in slots.
The channel busy/idle status is set up by introducing the
background traffic source as follows.
• Background traffic source’s operation: We assume ran-
dom packet arrivals at the background traffic source B ac-
cording to the Bernoulli process with rate λ (packet/slot).
If B is not transmitting, it becomes active with certain
probability when its queue is not empty. Once activated,
it will keep transmitting until its queue becomes empty.
Thus, there may be a continuous period of busy slots.
The length of such a busy period depends on the number
of previous idle slots. Hence, channel busy/idle states are
correlated over time. Therefore, both T and J need to
observe the past channel status over several time slots to
predict the current channel status.
The operation models for T , R and J are given as follows.
• Transmitter’s operation: Since there may be transmis-
sions from B at any time, the channel status may be
busy even when T and J do not transmit. In each slot, the
short initial period of time is allocated for T to sense the
channel, run its spectrum sensing algorithm, and detect
the channel (idle/busy) status. The length of a slot should
be no more than the time between changes in channel
(idle/busy) status. If the channel is detected as idle, T
can transmit data to R with power PT in this time slot.1
Otherwise, T remains idle. Without loss of generality, we
assume that T transmits only one packet in a time slot.
• Jammer’s operation: J also senses the spectrum and
predicts whether there will be a successful transmission
(with feedback ACK), or not (without a feedback) in a
time slot. If J predicts that there will be a successful
transmission, it jams with power PJ in this time slot.2
Otherwise, J remains idle.
• Receiver’s operation: If a transmission is not jammed,
the SINR at R is gTRPTN0+IR if channel is busy, or
gTRPT
N0
if
channel is idle, where IR is the interference from some
unobserved transmitters to R, N0 is a Gaussian noise
with power normalized as one, and gTR is the channel
gain between T and R. If a transmission is jammed, the
SINR at R is reduced to gTRPTN0+IR+gJRPJ (if channel is
busy) or gTRPTN0+gJRPJ (if channel is idle), where gJR is the
channel gain between J and R. It is assumed that the
signal strength diminishes proportionally to 1/d2, where
d is the distance between a transmitter and a receiver.
1We consider fixed transmit power since even if a transmitter can perform
power control, it will always use the maximum power (namely, fixed power,
Pmax allowed by its hardware) such that the success probability at the
receiver can be maximized.
2We initially focus on a fixed jamming power. Extension to adaptive
jamming power is discussed in Section V-C.
Log-normal shadowing is used as the shadowing model.
A transmission is successful if the SINR at R is larger
than some threshold β. The short ending period of a time
slot is allocated for R to send feedback (ACK) to T .
This general operation does not specify a particular algorithm
for T to make transmission decisions or for J to jam the
channel. Note that J does not jam all time slots, although
doing so can maximize the success of jamming. There are
two reasons to jam only the selected time slots. First, J will
be easily detected if it is jamming in all time slots due to
the high false alarm rate. Second, J may have power budget
in terms of the average jamming power, and thus cannot jam
all time slots. In Section V-C, we will present results for a
jammer with limited power budget.
B. Classifiers of Transmitter and Jammer
We consider the case that both T and J apply some machine
learning algorithms (unknown to each other) to make their
transmission decisions. Denote sensing results (noise power
or noise plus interference power) at time t as sT (t) and sJ(t)
for T and J , respectively. Note that due to different locations
of T and J and different channel effects, their sensing results
may be different in general, i.e., sT (t) 6= sJ(t) at any time t.
The classifiers used by T and J for transmission and jamming
decisions have the following properties.
• Transmitter’s classifier: T has a classifier CT that is pre-
trained by some machine learning algorithm and identifies
the current time slot t as idle or busy based on recent KT
sensing results (sT (t −KT + 1), · · · , sT (t − 1), sT (t)).
T uses
xT (t) = (sT (t−KT + 1), · · · , sT (t− 1), sT (t)) (1)
as its features in time slot t and
yT (t) = {“idle”, “busy”} (2)
as its labels in time slot t to build its training data
{(xT (t), yT (t))}t. Here, “idle” or “busy” means that the
channel is idle or busy, respectively. Note that T uses
multiple sensing results as its features since features
should be able to capture time correlation and help
achieve a high sensing accuracy in a short period of time.
Then classifier CT : xT (t) 7→ yT (t) defines the mapping
from sensing results to sensing decision and consequently
to transmission decision in time slot t.
• Jammers’s classifier: J does not know the classifier CT
and needs to build another classifier CJ itself by training
a deep learning classifier, which predicts whether there
will be a successful transmission, or not, in time slot
t based on recent KJ sensing results (sJ(t − KJ +
1), · · · , sJ(t− 1), sJ(t)). J uses
xJ(t) = (sJ(t−KJ + 1), · · · , sJ(t− 1), sJ(t)) (3)
as its features in time slot t and the presence and absence
of ACK after transmission, namely
yJ(t) = {“ACK”, “no ACK”} (4)
as its labels in time slot t to build its training data.
Here, “ACK” or “no ACK” means that there is an ACK
following a transmission, or not, respectively. Then clas-
sifier CJ : xJ(t) 7→ yJ(t) defines the mapping from
sensing results to prediction of successful transmission
and consequently to jamming decision in time slot t.
The deep neural network is a universal approximator and is ex-
pected to match and exceed the performance of any rule-based
scheme (such as an energy detector). Therefore, we assume
transmitter and jammer use deep neural networks as classifiers
CT and CJ , respectively, each with different hyperparameters
selected to optimize their individual performance.
C. Performance Measures
To evaluate the accuracy of a classifier, we define error
probabilities on misdetection eMD and false alarm eFA for
T and J .
• Misdetection for T : A time slot is idle, but T predicts it
as busy.
• False alarm for T : A time slot is busy, but T predicts it
as idle.
• Misdetection for J : T ’s transmission is successful, but J
predicts there will not be an ACK.
• False alarm for J : T does not transmit or T ’s transmis-
sion fails (even without jamming), but J predicts that
there will be an ACK.
T and J individually optimize the hyperparameters of their
own deep neural networks (namely their classifiers) to min-
imize their own value of max{eMD, eFA}. This objective
ensures a small error for each class.
In addition, we also measure T ’s performance by throughput
and success ratio.
• Throughput: The number of received packets at R during
a period divided by the number of time slots in this
period.
• Success ratio: The percentage of successful transmissions
by T during a period over all transmissions during this
period.
IV. TRANSMITTER’S OPERATION
T applies a deep learning (deep neural network) based
classifier to determine the channel status. Note that T could
also use a simpler machine learning algorithm at the expense
of potential performance loss. T senses the channel and
records the most recent KT received signal strength indicator
(RSSI) results. In time slot t, T uses these sensing results
to build the feature set xT (t) given in (1). For numerical
results, we assume KT = 10. In time slot t, T uses the current
channel busy/idle status as its label LT (t). Each result is either
a Gaussian noise N0 with normalized unit power (when the
channel is idle) or noise plus the transmit power from the
unobserved transmitter received at T , i.e., N0+ IT (when the
channel is busy), where IT is the interference received at T .
After observing a certain period of time, T collects a
number of samples as training data to train the deep learning
classifier CT that returns labels “idle” and “busy”. For that pur-
pose, 1000 samples are collected by T and split by half to build
its training and test data. T trains an FNN as the deep learning
classifier CT . The Microsoft Cognitive Toolkit (CNTK) [34]
is used to train the FNN. T optimizes the hyperparameters of
the deep neural network to minimize max{eMD, eFA}. When
the arrival rate λ for B is 0.2 (packet/slot), the optimized
hyperparameters of CT are found as follows:
• The neural network consists of one hidden layer with 100
neurons.
• The cross entropy loss function (given in (5)) is mini-
mized to train the neural network with backpropagation
algorithm [35].
C(θ) = −
∑
i
[yT ]i log
((
[aL(xT )
]
i
)
+
(1− [yT ]i) log
(
1− [aL (xT )]i
)
,
(5)
where θ is the set of the neural network parameters, xT
is the training data vector, yT is the corresponding label
vector, and aL (xT ) is the output of the neural network
at the last layer L.
• The output layer uses softmax activation such that for
input z, the kth entry of the activation function output is
given by [σ(z)]k = e
zk∑
j e
zj .
• The hidden layers are activated using the sigmoid func-
tion such that for input z, the kth entry of the activation
function output is given by [σ(z)]k = 11+e−zk .
• All weights and biases are initialized to random values
in [−1.0, 1.0].
• The input values are unit normalized in the first training
pass.
• The minibatch size is 25.
• The momentum coefficient to update the gradient is 0.9.
• The number of epochs per time slot is 10.
After training the FNN with these hyperparameters, we run
T ’s classifier over 500 time slots to evaluate its performance.
We set PB = PT = 1000N0, and β = 3. The positions of the
T , R and B are fixed at locations (0, 0), (10, 0), and (0, 10),
respectively. We have dTR = 10 and dTB = 10. We extend
the model to a mobile network in Section VIII. For these
scenario parameters, T can build a very good classifier (in
fact we have eMD = eFA = 0). T makes 400 transmissions
and 383 of them are successful. Note that 17 transmissions on
idle channels fail due to random channel conditions. Thus, the
throughput is 383/500 = 0.766 packet/slot and the success
ratio is 383/400 = 95.75%. In Section V, we will show
how adversarial deep learning-based jammer can reduce this
performance significantly.
V. JAMMER’S OPERATION
A. Adversarial Deep Learning-based Jammer
It is viable to infer a machine learning (including deep
learning) classifier via the exploratory attack that has been
applied to text classification in [8] and to image classification
in [9]. In these previous works, the basic idea was to call
the target classifier and obtain labels of a number of samples
and then train a functionally equivalent classifier using deep
learning. Two classifiers are functionally equivalent if they
provide the same labels for the same sample. However, this
approach cannot be applied to the setting in this paper. Due
to different locations of T and J , random channel gain and
random noise, the sensing results at T and J will be different.
That is, when the channel is idle, both T and J sense a
Gaussian noise N0 but the value may be different due to
different realizations. When the channel is busy, T will sense
N0 + IT and J will sense N0 + IJ . Thus, in addition to
different realizations of N0, the values of IT and IJ are
different due to different channel gains to T and J , as well as
their different realizations. Thus, even if J has a functionally
equivalent classifier (e.g., T ’s classifier), J cannot use it to
obtain the same channel status as the one predicted by T due
to different sensing results (or features computed for deep
learning). Moreover, J does not aim to predict whether the
channel is idle or busy. Instead, its goal is to predict whether
there will be a successful transmission by T , or not. These
are different goals since a successful transmission depends on
the SINR and therefore it depends not only on the presence
of background signal but also on channel gain and noise.
In addition, the perceptions of sensed signals are different
because of different locations and channel instances.
There are four cases for the channel status and T ’s behavior:
1) channel is idle and T is transmitting,
2) channel is busy and T is not transmitting,
3) channel is idle and T is not transmitting, and
4) channel is busy and T is transmitting.
Ideally, the last two cases should be rare cases, since they
refer to wrong sensing decisions by T . J needs to detect
the presence of an ACK message transmission when T ’s
transmission is successful. Note that J does not attempt to
decode ACK messages.3 Then J can use the most recent
10 sensing results as features (i.e., L = 10) and the current
feedback (ACK or no ACK) as a label to build one sample.
J aims to jam successful transmissions (with received ACK
feedback) only. Thus, J defines two labels as “ACK” (i.e., “a
successful transmission”) and “no ACK” (i.e., “no successful
transmission”). Thus, the labels at J are also different from T .
In summary, we contrast the classifiers for T and J as follows.
For T ’s classifier,
• the features for deep learning are T ’s sensing results and
• the predicted labels are “idle” and “busy”,
while for J’s classifier,
• the features are J’s sensing results and
• the predicted labels are “ACK” and “no ACK”.
After observing a certain number of time slots, J collects a
number of samples to be used as training data and trains a
3ACK messages are typically distinct from data messages in the sense that
they are short and follow the data transmission with some time lag. To ensure
ACK can be reliably received, it is usually coded such that the required SNR to
receive the ACK is much smaller than that for data packet. Hence, we assume
that J can reliably detect the presence of ACK message transmissions and
distinguish them from data transmissions.
deep learning classifier. Once the classifier is built, J uses it
to predict the status in any future time slot, i.e., whether there
will be a successful transmission, or not. If yes, J transmits
in this slot. Note that when J launches its attack, it does not
need to collect ACKs anymore.
J trains an FNN as the deep learning classifier CJ . For
that purpose, 1000 samples are collected by J and split
by half to build its training and test data. J optimizes the
hyperparameters to minimize max{eMD, eFA}. The training
time (including hyperparameter optimization) is 67 seconds
and the test time per sample is 0.024 milliseconds. The
optimized hyperparameters of the CJ are found as follows.
• The neural network consists of two hidden layers with
50 neurons.
• The cross entropy loss function is used to train the deep
neural network with backpropagation algorithm.
• The output layer uses softmax activation.
• The hidden layers are activated using the hyperbolic tan-
gent (Tanh) function such that for input z, the kth entry
of the activation function output is given by [σ(z)]k =
ezk−e−zk
ezk+e−zk .
• All weights and biases are initialized to random values
in [−1.0, 1.0].
• The input values are unit normalized in the first training
pass.
• The minibatch size is 25.
• The momentum coefficient to update the gradient is 0.9.
• The number of epochs per time slot is 10.
After training the deep neural network with these hyperpa-
rameters, we run classifiers of J and T over 500 time slots
to evaluate the attack performance. The positions of T , R and
B, and their transmit powers are given in Section IV. The
position of J is fixed at location (10, 10) and its jamming
power is PJ = 1000N0. Thus, we have dJR = 10 and
dJT = 10
√
2. In these time slots, if there is no attack (i.e.,
no jamming), T will have 383 successful transmissions. Under
J’s attack, the number of misdetections is 16, i.e., misdetection
probability is eMD = 16/383 = 4.18% (majority of successful
transmissions are jammed), and the number of false alarms is
17, i.e., false alarm probability is eFA = 17/(500 − 383) =
14.53%. The impact of this attack is significant. There are
only 25 successful transmissions among 400 transmissions.
Thus, the throughput of T is reduced from 0.766 packet/slot
to 25/500 = 0.05 packet/slot and the success ratio of T is
reduced from 95.75% to 25/400 = 6.25%.
B. Sensing-based and Random Jamming as Benchmark
Schemes
For comparison purposes, we consider two alternative jam-
ming schemes for J .
1) Sensing-based jamming: J jams the channel if its
received power (noise or noise plus signal) during
spectrum sensing in the current slot is greater than
a threshold τ . The performance of a sensing-based
jammer is highly dependent on the selected threshold
τ . If τ is selected too low, the number of false alarms
increases. Then J consumes more power than required
and this is not desired if it has a power constraint or
objective. If τ is selected too high, then the number
of misdetections increases. This threshold is usually
given as a fixed value since adjusting the threshold
optimally for a given false alarm and misdetection rate is
difficult without using past sensing results and tracking
the ACK messages from the receiver as a feedback. We
evaluated the performance of the sensing-based jammer
with different τ values. Then we select τ that minimizes
max{eMD, eFA} and use it to compute the throughput
and the success ratio of the transmitter in the presence
of sensing-based jammer. This approach allows for a
fair comparison between the performance of the sensing-
based and adversarial deep learning-based jammer. Table
I shows the misdetection and false alarm probabilities for
τ values from 1 to 9. τ = 1 is the lowest τ that makes
misdetection rate 0% based on the observed RSSI levels.
However, it provides a high false alarm rate. τ = 3.4
is determined to be the best threshold that minimizes
max{eMD, eFA}.
2) Random jamming: J jams the channel in some ran-
domly selected instances. Such an attack scheme does
not require J to learn the channel’s busy/idle sta-
tus. As in deep learning-based and sensing-based jam-
mers, jamming probability pJ is selected to minimize
max{eMD, eFA}. The jammer and transmitter actions
are independent from each other, therefore eMD =
1− pJ and eFA = pJ . As a result, pJ is selected as 0.5
with max{eMD, eFA} = 50%. The impact of this attack
is not as significant as deep learning based-jamming. The
throughput can only be reduced from 0.766 packet/slot
to 0.383 packet/slot and the success ratio can only be
reduced from 95.75% to 47.88%.
The results are summarized in Table II with using the best
parameters (threshold or probability) in all three jamming
approaches. Both sensing-based jamming and random jam-
ming are not as effective as deep learning-based jamming
since random jamming does not utilize any sensing result
while sensing-based jamming only uses the sensing result
in the current time slot. On the other hand, deep learning-
based jamming considers sensing results in recent time slots
and generates a score for the likelihood of an ACK. In
addition, deep learning tunes a threshold for these scores to
minimize the classification errors. Thus, the deep learning-
based jamming performs better than the other two attack
schemes.
C. Jamming Power Control with an Average Power Constraint
In this section, we consider the case that J has some power
budget in terms of the average jamming power Pavg per slot.
That is, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
pt ≤ Pavg (6)
TABLE I
DETERMINING THE SENSING THRESHOLD FOR SENSING-BASED JAMMER.
Threshold Misdetection False alarm max{eMD, eFA}
prob. (eMD) prob. (eFA)
1 0.0% 14.2% 14.2%
2 0.6% 14.0% 14.0%
3 8.8% 13.4% 13.4%
3.4 12.8% 12.6% 12.8%
(Best Thr.)
4 19.2% 10.2% 19.2%
5 30.0% 7.0% 30.0%
6 44.2% 5.0% 44.2%
7 52.2% 3.6% 52.2%
8 56.8% 2.6% 56.8%
9 60.6% 1.4% 60.6%
TABLE II
EFFECT OF DIFFERENT ATTACK TYPES ON THE TRANSMITTER’S
PERFORMANCE.
Attack type Throughput Success ratio
No attack 0.766 95.75%
Adversarial deep learning 0.050 6.25%
Sensing-based attack (τ = 3.4) 0.140 16.99%
Random attack 0.383 47.88%
for large T , where pt is the jamming power in slot t. J
applies power control by adjusting pt in [Pmin, Pmax]. The
deep learning classifier not only provides the label for each
slot, but also a score for this classification. This score s
is compared with a threshold S and if s in a slot satisfies
s ≤ S, it is classified as a slot with ACK. Then s also
represents the confidence of classification, i.e., the confidence
of classification is high if s is small. Thus, a solution of power
control should be a decreasing function p(s) of s in [0, S] and
p(s) value should be either within [Pmin, Pmax] or zero (i.e.,
no transmission).
We develop a piecewise linear function p(s) as follows.
1) Denote the average power required by function p(s) =
Pmin as P1. If P1 ≥ Pavg, J may not jam all slots with
s ≤ S even using the minimum jamming power. Thus,
J should not jam some slots with low classification
confidence, i.e., with s close to S. We need to find a
suitable c ∈ [0, S] such that the following p(s) meets
the power budget: p(s) = Pmin if s ≤ c, and p(s) = 0
otherwise. This c value can be determined by the training
data used to train J’s classifier.
2) Denote the average power required by function p(s) =
Pmax as P2. If P2 ≤ Pavg, J can jam all slots with
s ≤ S even using the maximum jamming power. Thus,
we have p(s) = Pmax. The scenario in Section V-A can
be regarded as this special case when we set Pavg = PJ .
3) In the above two cases, Pavg is either very small or
very large. As a consequence, jamming power is fixed
as either Pmin or Pmax. For the other cases, denote the
average power required by function p(s) = Pmax − c1s
as P3, where c1 = Pmax−PminS . For this linear function,
TABLE III
THE EFFECT OF JAMMER’S POWER BUDGET ON THE TRANSMITTER’S
PERFORMANCE.
Pavg Throughput (packet/slot) Success ratio
0 0.766 95.75%
0.2 · Pmax 0.428 53.50%
0.4 · Pmax 0.170 21.25%
0.6 · Pmax 0.094 11.75%
0.8 · Pmax 0.066 8.25%
Pmax 0.050 6.25%
we have p(0) = Pmax and p(S) = Pmin.
a) If P3 = Pavg, we use p(s) = Pmax − c1s.
b) If P3 > Pavg , J needs to use a smaller jamming
power for each slot with s ≤ S. In particular, we
consider p(s) = max{Pmax − cs, Pmin} for some
c > c1 to meet the power budget. This c value can
be determined by the training data used to train J’s
classifier.
c) If P3 < Pavg , J can use a larger jamming power
for each slot with s ≤ S. In particular, we consider
p(s) = min{Pmin + c(S − s), Pmax} for some
c > c1 to meet the power budget. This c value can
be determined by the training data used to train J’s
classifier.
We assume that the distribution of score s in the training data
is the same as the distribution of s in the test data in the above
analysis and algorithm design. In reality, these two distribu-
tions are similar but may not be exactly the same. As a result,
we may observe that 1T
∑T
t=1 pt > Pavg for some large T .
Instead, the achieved power budget P
(
1
T
∑T
t=1 pt ≤ Pavg
)
is close to 1 for large T .
Table III shows results for different Pavg values, where we
assume Pmin = 500N0 and Pmax = 1000N0. Note that the
two extreme cases Pavg = 0 and Pavg = Pmax correspond
to the case of no attack and the case of no power budget,
respectively. Thus, the performance are the same as those
in the first two rows of Table II. For other cases, results
in Table III show that with a larger power budget, J can
successfully jam more transmissions and thus T ’s performance
(throughput and success ratio) becomes worse.
VI. JAMMING ATTACK WITH LIMITED TRAINING DATA
COLLECTED
The attack results presented in Sec. V are obtained by
assuming that J collects 500 samples to build its classifier
CJ with small errors and 500 samples to test it. However,
this may require a long learning period before launching the
attack. It is important to shorten the initial learning period
of J and reduce the response time of J to start jamming.
To reduce this learning period, J applies the GAN [10]
approach to generate synthetic data based on real data in a
short learning period. Then it uses these synthetic data samples
to augment the training data. Synthetic data has been widely
used in machine learning applications to extend the training
Real data: 𝒙
Labels: 𝒚
Synthetic data
𝐺(𝒛, 𝒚)
Noise: 𝒛
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Fig. 2. Conditional GAN for training data augmentation.
datasets. Conventionally, image processing applications are
known to benefit from additional data generated by scaling
and rotating the existing images. Recently, GAN is used
to generate synthetic images to augment training data for
computer vision, text, and cyber applications [36]–[38]. In
this paper, we use the GAN to generate synthetic spectrum
data. In the GAN, there are two neural networks, namely the
generator G and the discriminator D, playing a minimax game
formulated as:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pdata [log(D(x))]− Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))],
(7)
where z is a noise input to generator G with a model
distribution of pz and G(z) is the generator output. Input
data x has distribution pdata and discriminator D distinguishes
between the real and generated samples. Both G and D are
trained using the backpropagation algorithm. However, when
G is trained with the objective in (7), the gradients of G
rapidly vanish that makes the training of GAN very difficult.
To address the vanishing gradient problem, it is proposed to
use
max
G
Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))] (8)
as the objective function at G [10]. In the first step, D is
trained to distinguish between the real and synthetic data. In
the second step, G takes random noise as input and maximizes
the probability of D making a mistake by creating samples that
resemble the real data. The original GAN implementation does
not include labels. Conditional GAN extends the GAN concept
such that the generator can generate synthetic data samples
with labels [39]. The objective function in conditional GAN
is similar to the one of a regular GAN, but the terms D(x)
and G(z) are replaced by D(x,y) and G(z,y), respectively,
to accommodate the labels y as conditions. The conditional
GAN used by the jammer is shown in Fig. 2.
We implemented the conditional GAN in TensorFlow [40]
by using the FNNs with two hidden layers for both G and
D. Leaky ReLu σ(x) = max(x, αx) is used as the activation
function with slope coefficient α set to 0.2. Adam optimizer
[41] is used as the optimizer to update the weights and biases.
The output of each hidden layer is normalized (via batch
normalization) before entering the activation function so that
the network converges faster both for G and D. The input data
includes the 10 most recent sensing results of the jammer and
the channel labels. Conditional GAN is trained for 3500 (deep
learning training) epochs where the generator network learns
the distribution of the input data. The losses of G and D are
shown in Fig. 3. We run the GAN training over 13500 epochs
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Fig. 3. Discriminator and generator losses during training.
and observe that the initial fluctuations in G and D losses drop
significantly after around 3000 epochs. Therefore, we stopped
training the GAN at 3500 epochs.
We assume that during the training of the GAN and the sub-
sequent deep learning used for transmission decision predic-
tion, channel statistics and background transmitter’s behavior
(an unknown decision function) do not change and therefore
the transmitter’s classifier (to be inferred by the jammer) does
not change, as well. The first part of the jammer’s algorithm is
data collection and training, and the second part is applying the
trained classifier to make attack decisions. Only in the second
part, we need to ensure that the algorithm is fast enough,
i.e., it is much shorter than channel coherence time. To make
one decision, the jammer needs to apply a pre-trained deep
learning network on a given sample. This process is very fast.
The test time per sample is measured as 0.024 milliseconds
(much smaller than the channel coherence time).
In the first part of the algorithm, assuming the resolution
of the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) levels is 1
second and 500 measurements are made (realistically needed
to infer the transmitter’s classifier), it takes 500 seconds to
collect 500 RSSI levels without using the GAN. In our tests,
it takes 23 seconds to train the GAN based on 10 real samples
(collected over 10 seconds) using a GeForce GTX 1080 GPU
and generate 500 synthetic samples from the GAN (this second
part is relatively very short). So, overall it takes 10 + 23
seconds to prepare data with the GAN. Hence, it takes either
33 seconds with the GAN or 500 seconds without the GAN
before the jammer starts training the other deep neural network
for success transmission prediction. As a result, the GAN
significantly reduces the data collection time of J before it
can start jamming.
For training data augmentation, J collects 10 samples and
then applies the conditional GAN to generate 500 synthetic
samples. The performance results with the GAN are sum-
marized in Table IV. If J builds its classifier CJ based on
10 real data samples, the error probabilities are 19.80% for
false alarm and 21.41% for misdetection. By using additional
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WITH AND WITHOUT THE GAN.
# measured # synthetic Misdetection False alarm
samples samples probability probability
10 0 21.41% 19.80%
10 500 10.71% 7.62%
500 0 10.90% 4.48%
500 synthetic data samples, the error probabilities drop to
7.62% for false alarm and to 10.71% for misdetection. These
errors are much smaller than the errors when only 10 real data
samples are used and are close to the errors when total of 500
real data samples are used to train the deep neural network.
VII. DEFENSE SCHEME
A. Defense against Adversarial Deep Learning-based Jam-
ming
We design a defense scheme where T changes the labels
for some samples such that J cannot build a reliable classifier
in an exploratory attack, i.e., T poisons the training process
of J by providing wrong training data. This corresponds to a
causative (or poisoning) attack of T back at J as a defense
scheme. Against the jamming attack, T needs to change the
label “ACK” (i.e., “a successful transmission”) to “No ACK"
(i.e., “no successful transmission”), and vice versa. For that
purpose, T flips labels, i.e.,
• T does not transmit even if channel is predicted as idle,
and
• T transmits even if channel is predicted as busy.
It is clear that T wants to limit the extent of defense oper-
ations such that the overhead for defense (i.e., the increased
classification error for its own transmission decisions) can be
minimized. Otherwise, T would start making a large number
of transmission errors and could not sustain a good throughput
even without any jammer in presence. Suppose that T decides
to flip labels for pd percentage (%) of time slots. To achieve the
best effect, T needs to carefully select in which time slots to
perform defense operations by examining the output of its deep
learning algorithm. In fact, a deep learning-based classifier
provides not only labels, but also a score for classification.
In particular, there is a classification score in [0,1], namely
the likelihood of whether a channel is idle. If this score
is less than a threshold, a time slot is classified as idle;
otherwise it is classified as busy. For T ’s classifier built in
Section IV, this threshold is 0.25, which is chosen to minimize
max{eMD, eFA}. Moreover, if this score is far away from
the threshold, then such a classification has a high confidence;
otherwise the confidence is low. Therefore, to maximize the
impact on J , T should perform defense operations in time
slots when the scores close to 0 or 1 are obtained, since
they correspond to time slots when T ’s transmission decisions
are more predictable. As a consequence of this defense with
different pd values, J builds different classifiers with different
hyperparameters (see Table V) compared to the previous case
of no defense in Section V. Note that when the number of
TABLE V
OPTIMIZED HYPERPARAMETER VALUES OF THE JAMMER UNDER
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEFENSE.
pd # hidden # neurons Activation
layers per layer function
0% (no defense) 2 50 Tanh
10% 1 60 Sigmoid
20% 1 90 Sigmoid
30% 2 50 Sigmoid
40% 2 80 Tanh
50% 2 20 Sigmoid
layers is 1, the deep neural network reduces to a standard
neural network with one hidden layer.
Table VI shows the results when T performs different
numbers of defense operations. We can see that even when
T makes deliberately wrong decisions only over 10% of all
time slots (i.e., pd = 10%), J’s error probabilities increase sig-
nificantly, i.e., misdetection probability increases from 4.18%
to 17.53% and false alarm probability increases from 14.53%
to 23.68%. We also calculate the performance of T when J
performs a jamming attack in any time slot when T can have
a successful transmission if not jammed. With more defense
operations (i.e., when more labels are flipped and therefore
pd is large), T can increase its throughput and success ratio.
However, if T takes too many (e.g., pd = 30%) defense
operations, its performance starts dropping as its spectrum
sensing decisions become more unreliable and its transmission
becomes less likely to succeed even in the absence of jamming.
Note that the success ratio is defined as the ratio of the suc-
cessful transmissions over the total number of transmissions.
With the defense mechanism, the transmitter can choose to
decrease the total number of transmissions. As a result, the
throughput can increase with the decreasing success ratio.
B. Defense against Sensing-based and Random Jamming
Next, we apply this defense against sensing-based and ran-
dom jammers. Table VII shows the results under sensing-based
jamming when the threshold τ is set to 3.4 (as determined to be
the best threshold for J in Section V-B). J’s sensing threshold
remains fixed during the defense operation. J continues to
jam the signal whenever the transmitter flips its decision from
“do not transmit” to “transmit”. As a result, both misdetection
and false alarm rates decrease. The throughput of T also
decreases due to the additional jamming and the decision made
not to transmit when the channel is available. The proposed
attack mitigation technique is not successful with sensing-
based jamming compared to the jamming based on adversarial
deep learning.
Table VIII shows the results under random jamming with
jammer probability of misdetection and false alarm both set
to 50% (i.e., when the jammer transmit probability pJ is 0.5).
We can see that random jamming is not effective, as well,
and results in higher error probabilities compared to jamming
based on adversarial deep learning.
Fig. 4. The search for the best pd value in the transmitter’s defense scheme.
Fig. 5. The throughput achieved during the search for the best pd value.
C. Defense against Unknown Jammer Types
As expected, the defense mechanism does not work against
random and sensing-based attacks. T may not know what
kind of jammer (if any) is launching the attack. Therefore,
we introduce an additional step for the transmitter’s defense
algorithm to start attack mitigation with a fixed level of defense
and then gradually increase or decrease the level of defense in
response to changes in its throughput that is measured through
the received ACK messages.
As we discussed above, if J applies a deep learning based-
attack, the optimal defense scheme should have pd > 0.
If J applies random or sensing-based attack, the optimal
defense scheme should have pd = 0. In general, T may not
know the attack scheme of J and thus we need to design a
general approach to search for the best pd value based on
the achieved throughput. A simple approach can be linear
search by evaluating a number of points within [0, 100]%, e.g.,
0%, 10%, · · · , 100%, and determining the best one for pd. To
have a better granularity, T further searches a number of points
TABLE VI
RESULTS FOR DEFENSE SCHEME AGAINST ADVERSARIAL DEEP LEARNING-BASED JAMMING ATTACK.
pd Jammer error probabilities Transmitter performance
Misdetection False alarm Throughput (packet/slot) Success ratio
0% (no defense) 4.18% 14.53% 0.050 6.25%
10% 17.53% 23.68% 0.132 17.98%
20% 32.80% 33.33% 0.216 31.67%
30% 33.92% 38.25% 0.194 30.41%
40% 35.83% 37.31% 0.178 31.67%
50% 38.97% 38.33% 0.170 32.32%
TABLE VII
RESULTS FOR DEFENSE SCHEME AGAINST SENSING-BASED JAMMING ATTACK WHEN τ = 3.4.
pd Jammer error probabilities Transmitter performance
Misdetection False alarm Throughput (packet/slot) Success ratio
0% (no defense) 12.8% 12.6% 0.140 16.99%
10% 11.0% 12.2% 0.124 16.32%
20% 10.8% 11.0% 0.120 16.81%
30% 9.20% 10.4% 0.100 15.72%
40% 8.40% 7.8% 0.098 17.31%
50% 7.40% 8.0% 0.084 16.67%
TABLE VIII
RESULTS FOR DEFENSE SCHEME AGAINST RANDOM JAMMING ATTACK WHEN JAMMER TRANSMIT PROBABILITY IS 0.5.
pd Transmitter performance
Throughput (packet/slot) Success ratio
0% (no defense) 0.383 47.88%
10% 0.345 46.58%
20% 0.306 45.06%
30% 0.268 43.24%
40% 0.230 41.04%
50% 0.192 38.30%
around the current best value to find a better pd value and
repeat this process until there is no improvement or the desired
granularity is achieved. For example, the best pd in Table VI
that maximizes T ’s throughput is 20%. T further searches
around 20% with a smaller step size, i.e., 15% or 25%, and
achieves the throughput of 0.182 or 0.202, respectively. So,
pd = 20% is still the best. T repeats this process and finally
determines that pd = 20% is the best choice. For sensing-
based jammer (with τ = 3.4) and random jammer, pd = 0%
provides the optimal level of defense. This search process is
shown in Figs. 4 and 5 for all jammers, where “ADL” refers
to jamming based on adversarial deep learning, “Sensing 3.4”
refers to sensing-based jamming with τ = 3.4, and “Random”
refers to random jamming. “Terminate” points at the iteration
where the search of T for the best pd terminates. T starts using
this best pd value from the next iteration on. Each iteration
corresponds to 500 time slots. In addition to linear search,
more advanced searching approaches such as golden section
search can also be applied by T to determine pd with as
smaller number of search iterations. To react to different types
of jammers, T starts with some pd and updates pd based on its
achieved throughput. Fig. 4 shows that pd is reduced over time
when J turns out to be a sensing-based or random jammer,
whereas pd is increased to a higher value (beyond which
errors in transmit decisions start reducing T ’s throughput)
when J turns out to be an adversarial deep learning-based
jammer. Therefore, T can readily adapt when the type of
jammer changes over time assuming the convergence time (10
iterations) is smaller than the period of changes in the jammer
type.
VIII. EXTENSION OF NETWORK SETTING
A. Extension to Mobile Setting
The results provided in the previous sections are based on
a static network scenario where the positions of T , R, B and
J are fixed at locations (0, 0), (10, 0), (0, 10), and (10, 10),
respectively. In this section, we evaluate the performance
of the proposed system for mobile jammer scenarios. Both
transmitter and jammer algorithms can be readily applied
in mobile wireless networks. When we considered a static
network instance, we did not customize our algorithm to
explore the static topology. In the training data, features are
derived from sensing results and labels are derived from ACKs,
which do not depend on topology. As a result, the same
algorithms can be applied when the network is mobile. Note
that the distance dBJ between B and J affects J’s capability
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Fig. 6. The jammer moves along a circle centered at the receiver.
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Fig. 7. The jammer moves along a circle centered at the background traffic
source.
of detection idle/busy channel while the distance dJR between
J and R affects the J’s capability of jamming. Thus, we fix
one of them and study the impact of the other distance. We
have the following scenarios.
• The distance dJR between J and R is fixed, i.e., J moves
along a circle centered at R with radius 10. In this case,
we have 10(
√
2− 1) ≤ dBJ ≤ 10(
√
2 + 1).
• The distance dBJ between B and J is fixed, i.e., J moves
along a circle centered at B with radius 10. In this case,
we have 10(
√
2− 1) ≤ dJR ≤ 10(
√
2 + 1).
Fig. 6 shows the scenario when J moves along a circle
centered at R and Fig. 7 shows the scenario when J moves
along a circle centered at B.
For each case, we check five different distance values, i.e.,
10(
√
2−1), 10, 15, 20, and 10(√2+1). Tables IX and X show
the results when J moves along a circle centered at R and B,
respectively. Table IX shows that with increasing dBJ , it is
more challenging for J to learn channel condition and thus
its classifier has larger errors. Therefore, T achieves a better
performance in terms of throughput and success ratio. Table IX
shows that with increasing dJR, the impact of jamming
is smaller. Therefore, even if the errors to predict channel
condition do not change, T achieves a better performance due
to less interference.
B. Extension of Communication Setting
The developed solution can be extended for multiple trans-
mitters and receivers, while interference from non-intended
transmitters is sensed as the additional interference term by
receivers. A transmitter still aims to predict whether the signal
strengths at its receiver (if it decides to transmit) will be good
or not based on past signal strengths. That is, the only change
in the transmitter algorithm is the training data, which includes
interference from non-intended transmitters.
We would still consider one jammer. Since each jammer can
jam a neighboring area, jammers can be deployed sparsely and
each jammer can perform jamming independently. Note that
a jammer only needs to predict whether there will be some
successful transmissions, i.e., there is no need to figure out
corresponding transmitters. Thus, a jammer does not need to
build a classifier for each transmitter. Instead, a jammer aims
to predict whether there will be successful transmissions. The
only change in the jammer algorithm is the training data,
which includes the superimposed signals received from all
transmitters and uses the ACKs from all receivers.
IX. CONCLUSION
We applied adversarial machine learning to design an
intelligent jamming attack on wireless communications and
presented a defense scheme against this attack. We consid-
ered a wireless communication scenario with one transmit-
ter, one receiver, one jammer, and some background traffic.
The transmitter senses the channel and applies a pre-trained
machine learning algorithm to detect idle channel instances
for transmission. The jammer does not have any knowledge
of transmitter’s algorithm. Instead, it senses the channel,
detects the transmission feedback (if available), applies a deep
learning algorithm to predict a successful transmission, and
jams such a transmission. In addition, the jammer uses the
deep learning classification scores to control its transmit power
subject to an average power constraint. We showed that this
attack is effective in reducing the transmitter’s throughput and
success ratio compared to random and sensing-based jamming
attacks. We also showed that the jammer can effectively apply
the GAN to shorten the learning period by augmenting the
training data with synthetic samples. Finally, we designed
a defense scheme for the transmitter that intentionally takes
wrong actions in selected time slots to mislead the jammer.
We showed that even a small percentage of wrong actions in
systematically selected time slots (based on the transmitter’s
classification scores) can significantly increase the errors in
jammer’s decisions and prevent major losses in the perfor-
mance of the transmitter. This defense scheme does not assume
the knowledge of the jammer type and allows the transmitter
to adjust its defense level on the fly based on its achieved
throughput.
TABLE IX
RESULTS WHEN J MOVES ALONG A CIRCLE CENTERED AT R.
dBJ Jammer error probabilities Transmitter performance
Misdetection False alarm Throughput (packet/slot) Success ratio
4.14 1.31% 13.68% 0.038 4.75%
10 4.18% 14.53% 0.050 6.25%
15 5.74% 14.53% 0.054 6.75%
20 13.58% 23.93% 0.114 14.25%
24.14 21.93% 23.08% 0.182 22.75%
TABLE X
RESULTS WHEN J MOVES ALONG A CIRCLE CENTERED AT B.
dJR jammer error probabilities Transmitter performance
Misdetection False alarm Throughput (packet/slot) Success ratio
4.14 4.18% 14.53% 0.032 4.00%
10 4.18% 14.53% 0.050 6.25%
15 4.18% 14.53% 0.208 26%
20 4.18% 14.53% 0.436 54.5%
24.14 4.18% 14.53% 0.558 69.75%
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